





Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy: 
Perception and Explication*
Abstract
Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interper-
sonal understanding is rooted in a sui	generis form of intentional experience, most com-
monly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing 
its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its 
defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in 
section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to 
some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian 
claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein’s insist-
ence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other’s own intentional 
experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lead 
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mental	 forms	 of	 intersubjectivity,	 but	 rather	
that	empathy	precedes	all	other	forms	of	 in-
















their	 analyses	 lead	 support	 to	 a	 conception	of	 empathy	 as	 experience,	 and	
more	specifically	as	an	intuitive	givenness	of	foreign	subjectivity.


































A	 question	 arises	 here	 concerning,	 in	Husserlian	 terms,	whether	 empathic	
































tional	experiences:	“The	intentionality	 in	one’s	own	ego	that	 leads	 into	 the	
foreign	ego	is	the	so-called	empathy”	(Husserl	1962:	321).	Similarly,	as	Stein	


















engages	 in	 detail	 with	 contemporary	 philo-




cal	Gesamtausgabe	 edition	of	Zum Problem 
der Einfühlung.	Where	 possible	 I	 have	 pro-
vided	references	to	the	translation	by	Waltraut	
Stein	 in	 square	 brackets,	 although	 I	 have	 at	
times	departed	from	her	 terminologically.	 In	
particular,	I	have	rendered	‘Erlebnis’	as	‘lived	
experience’,	 ‘Erfahrung’	 as	 ‘experience’,	
‘Originär’	as	 ‘originary’,	and	‘Vergegenwär-
tigung’	 as	 ‘presentification’.	When	 referring	
to	Husserl	on	 the	other	hand,	 I	have	 simply	
referred	to	the	pagination	of	the	critical	Hus-
serliana	series,	since	the	English	translations	














and	 immediate)	 fashion,	 the	other’s	experiences	as	 the	content	of	empathy	




































of	 being	 attentive	 to	 the	 subtle	 and	unique	manner	 in	which	our	 everyday	
familiarity	with	others	arises	and	is	grounded	in	experiential	life.
2. Empathic perception and expressivity
In	illuminating	certain	salient	aspects	of	this	account,	I	will	begin	by	focussing	






























is	experienced	as:	“from	the	very	beginning,	what this experience presents 






tation	 or	 pre-reflective	 self-awareness,	 and	
arguments	to	the	effect	that	it	should	inform	
















(2012),	 Overgaard	 (2012),	 Ratcliffe	 (2012),	


















































through	mathematical	 natural	 science	 (Husserl	 1952:	 8–10,	 27,	 76,	 84–90,	
186–8).	The	personalistic	attitude,	on	the	other	hand,	is	just	the	prior	attitude	
of	 everyday	 life,	 in	which	 subjects	 do	not	 adopt	 an	 abstractive	 orientation	
towards	 the	 objects	 of	 their	 surrounding	world	 (Umwelt),	 but	 rather	 expe-





absolute	and	unconditioned	cognitive	 relation	 to	 the	world	by	means	of	“a	
kind	of	 self-forgetfulness	of	 the	personal	Ego”,	only	 if	 the	abstraction	 just	







empathy	may	at	 least	gain	an	 initial	 footing.	And	for	Husserl,	 the	personal	

































physical	 aspects	 (namely	 the	 other’s	 lived	 experiences).	 It	 is	 only	 through	



































as	 Ideen II,	 since	 she	 elaborated	 and	 edited	
the	manuscripts	which	ultimately	found	their	
way	into	this	posthumously	published	work,	































in	empathy	is	 the	“unity	of	 the	‘expression’	and	the	‘expressed’”,	 the	other	




















in	 personalistic	 empathy	 the	 ‘merely	 physical’	 is	 at	 no	 stage	 given,	 rather	
what	presents	itself	is	a	whole,	the	person,	with	two	intertwined	dimensions,	
the	lived	body	as	essentially	personally	significant,	and	the	personal	subject	





one	 can	 speak	of	 at	 least	 a	 certain	 type	of	 empathy	 as	perceptual,	 so	 long	
as	one	respects	several	crucial	nuances.	First,	what	is	perceived	in	empathy	
is	not	a	 spatiotemporal	 thing,	but	 rather	another	person.	Second,	while	 the	






































other	 is	 the	 intentional	object,	 and	what	 she	 takes	 to	different	 level	of	 em-







pathy	 which	 Husserl	 takes	 to	 underlie	 such	
experience	 is	mediate	 and	 reifying,	 and	 that	
his	 account	 is	 therefore	 ultimately	 unable	
to	 do	 justice	 to	 the	 direct	 character	 of	 life-
worldly	 alien	 encounters	 (Theunissen	 1965:	
§§21–22).	 It	 seems	 to	 me,	 however,	 that	
Theunissen’s	 presentation	 of	 Ausdrucksver-
stehen	 fails	 to	do	 justice	 to	Husserl’s	 insist-
ence	 that	 personalistic	 empathy	 is	 first	 and	
foremost	an	intuitive	experience	of	the	other	
as	 unitary	 embodied	Geist,	 and	 that	 the	 ex-







hin	 interpretiere.”	 (Theunissen	 1965:	 120)	



















In	 Stein’s	 example,	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 other	 as	 undergoing	 a	 particular	
mood	already	contains	tendencies	towards	a	fulfilling	explication,	by	means	









(Stein	 2008:	 25	 [1989:	 15])	But	what	 precisely	 does	 empathic	 explication	
amount	 to,	 if	 it	 is	neither	exactly	empathic	perception	and	yet	does	not	 in-
volve	the	experience	being	given	as	if	it	were	one’s	own?
Stein	describes	explication	as	“the	non-original	parallel	to	the	having	of	the	
experience”,	 by	which	 she	means	 that	while	 the	 empathic	 act	 is,	 like	 any	
experience,	 one	 originally	 had,	 the	 empathized	 content,	while	 being	 given	
as	the	content	of	an	original	experience,	is	not	given	in	the	manner	in	which	




what	 is	originally	present	 in	experiences	which	 the	subject	 is	not	currently	
undergoing.	That	is,	this	stage	of	empathy	is	more	closely	analogous	to	imagi-
nation	or	memory	than	perception,	in	that	the	empathizing	subject	becomes	
momentarily	aware	of	an	experiential	context	 in	 its	 lived	concreteness,	but	
one	 that	 differs	 in	 certain	 essential	ways	 from	 her	 own	 current	 perceptual	
sphere.	However,	Stein	 emphasizes	 that	here	 too	empathy	 remains	distinct	
from	imagination	and	memory,	 targeting	a	different	domain	of	experiences	
(namely,	 those	of	 the	other,	not	a	past	or	 imagined	self),	and	having	a	dif-














of	 the	mental	state	empathized,	a	 representation	which	moreover	 is	similar	
in	 its	 content	 and	 intentional	 object	 to	 the	 actual	mental	 state	 represented	















































Stein	 maintains	 that,	 despite	 differing	 from	
thing-perception	 in	 its	making	 present	what	
may	not	be	strictly	bodily	given	(but	only	co-
given),	it	is	precisely	the	non-representational	
character	 and	 evidential	 import	 of	 empathy	
that	 makes	 it	 comparable	 to	 the	 outer	 per-
ception	 of	material	 objects	 (Stein	 2008:	 31,	
37–38	 [1989:	 19,	 24]).	Given	 this,	 it	 seems	
to	me	 that	when	Dullstein	 stipulates	 that,	 in	
occasionally	characterizing	empathy	as	a	per-
ception	Stein	merely	“tried	to	take	her	super-
visor’s	 views	 into	 account	 and	 to	point	 to	 a	
possible	way	of	combining	her	and	Husserl’s	
ideas”	(Dullstein	2013:	343),	she	underplays	
the	 structural	 similarities	 which	 Stein	 often	
stresses	 between	 thing-perception	 and	 em-
pathy.	Moreover,	it	is	also	worthwhile	noting	
that	when	Stein	distinguishes	 empathy	 from	
perception,	 she	 always	distinguishes	 it	 from	
the	 perception	 of	 material	 objects.	 Conse-
quently,	I	see	no	basis	for	supposing	that	Stein	










(Husserl	 1952:	 198).	And	he	writes	 that	 in	 the	 “comprehensive experience 



































subject	always	 involves	an	element	of	comprehension	of	 the	other’s	 inten-
tional	directedness.
It	 seems	 to	me	 that	on	 this	point	Husserl’s	and	Stein’s	 respective	accounts	
are	not	 in	 fact	mutually	exclusive.	With	Stein,	one	can	maintain	 that	 there	
are	many	cases	in	which	one’s	immediate	apprehension	of	the	other	involves	
a	 certain	 emptiness	 of	 content,	 which	 then	 becomes	 determinate	 and	 full	
through	 the	other’s	 intentional	 experiences	being	 explicated.	This	may	oc-






















































In	 fact,	 both	 Husserl	 and	 Stein	 distinguish	
between	 different	 levels	 of	 empathy,	 with	
the	most	 basic	 experiential	 achievement	 be-
ing	a	passively	occurring	apperception	of	the	
other’s	body	as	a	 living	body	which	 senses,	
and	 they	maintain	 that	 on	 this	 primitive	 ex-
periential	level	there	is	not	yet	the	expression	
of	Geist,	 that	 the	 other	 is	 not	 here	 encoun-
tered	as	a	subject	of	intentional	activity	(Stein	
2008:	 74–79	 [1989:	 56–61],	Husserl	 1973a:	
455–457).	But	the	recognition	of	such	levels	
need	 not	motivate	 the	 denial	 of	 the	 claim	 I	
have	 been	 attributing	 to	 them	 here,	 namely	
that	 in	 personalistic	 empathy	 the	 other	 is	
experienced	 as	 an	 embodied	 and	 intentional	
mind	“without	further	ado”,	since	this	thesis	
is	 entirely	 compatible	with	 a	more	 nuanced	
understanding	 of	 the	 various	 intentions	 and	
motivational	 relationships	 inherent	 within	
personalistic	 empathy.	 Indeed	 a	 complete	
account	 of	 the	 phenomenology	 of	 empathy	




















proach	to	Intersubjectivity.	Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences,	7(1),	133–142.
Dullstein,	M.	(2013).	Direct	Perception	and	Simulation:	Stein’s	Account	of	Empathy.	Re-




Hopp,	W.	(2011).	Perception and Knowledge. A Phenomenological Account.	Cambridge:	
Cambridge	University	Press.
Husserl,	E.	(1950).	Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge.	Husserliana	1.	The	
Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.
Husserl,	E.	(1952).	Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Phi-
losophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution.	Husser-
liana	4.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.





Husserl,	E.	 (1966).	Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungs-
manuskripten.	Husserliana	11.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.
Husserl,	E.	 (1973a).	Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II.	Husserliana	14.	The	
Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.
Husserl,	E.	(1973b).	Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III.	Husserliana	15.	The	
Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.
Husserl,	E.	(1976).	Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Phi-
losophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Husserliana	
III/1.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff.
Husserl,	E.	(1989).	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution.	Trans.	R.	Rojce-
wicz	&	A.	Schuwer.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic.
Husserl,	E.	(2001).	Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis.	Lectures on Tran-
scendental Logic.	Trans.	A.	J.	Steinbock.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic	Press.
Husserl,	E.	(2014).	Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. 










Overgaard,	S.	(2012).	Other	People.	In:	D.	Zahavi	(ed.),	The Oxford Handbook of Contem-
porary Phenomenology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.
Ratcliffe,	M.	(2012).	Phenomenology	as	a	Form	of	Empathy.	Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal of Philosophy,	55(5),	473–495.
Shum,	 P.	 (2012).	 Edith	 Stein	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Empathy:	 Locating	Ascription	 and	 a	
Structural	Relation	to	Picture	Consciousness.	Journal of the British Society for Phenom-
enology,	43(2),	178–194.
Smith,	 J.	 (2010).	 Seeing	 Other	 People.	 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	
81(3):	731–748.
Stein,	E.	(1989).	On the Problem of Empathy.	Trans.	W.	Stein.	Washington:	ICS	Publishers.
Stein,	E.	(2008).	Zum Problem der Einfühlung.	Edith-Stein-Gesamtausgabe	5.	Freiburg:	
Herder.




Theunissen,	M.	(1965).	Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart.	Berlin:	
Walter	de	Gruyter	&	Co.
Thompson,	E.	 (2001).	 Empathy	 and	Consciousness.	 Journal of Consciousness Studies,	
8(5–7),	1–32.
de	Vignemont,	F.	(2010).	Knowing	Other	People’s	Mental	States	as	if	They	Were	One’s	




Walsh,	P.	 J.	 (2014).	Empathy,	Embodiment,	 and	 the	Unity	of	Expression.	Topoi,	33(1),	
215–226.
Zahavi,	D.	(1999).	Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation.	Evan-
ston:	Northwestern	University	Press.





Decety	(ed.),	Empathy. From Bench to Bedside	(3–20).	Cambridge:	MIT	Press.
Zahavi,	D.	(2014a).	Empathy	and	Other-Directed	Intentionality.	Topoi,	33(1),	129–142.











Husserl i Stein o fenomenologiji empatije: percepcija i eksplikacija
Sažetak
U fenomenološkoj tradiciji često se nalaze hrabre tvrdnje da je interpersonalno razumijevanje uko-
rijenjeno u sui	generis obliku intencionalnog iskustva, koji se najčešće naziva empatijom (Einfüh-
lung). Ovaj rad istražuje te tvrdnje, naglašujući njihov specifičan karakter, te ispituje fenomenološ-
ka razmatranja u obrani tih tvrdnji koje su ponudili dva istaknuta zagovaratelja, Edmund Husserl i 
Edith Stein. U drugome dijelu, nakon iznošenja nekih uvodnih indikacija kako bi se empatija uopće 
trebala razumijevati, pažnju pridajem nekim karakterizacijama specifične strukture empatije, uzi-
majući u obzir u trećemu poglavlju huserlovsku tvrdnju da su neki oblici empatije opažajne naravi, 
te u četvrtome poglavlju inzistiranje Edith Stein da empatičko iskustvo često uključuje eksplici-
ranje intencionalnih iskustava drugih. Peto poglavlje zaključujem s procjenom razine do koje 




Husserl und Stein zur Phänomenologie der Empathie: Perzeption und Explikation
Zusammenfassung
Innerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition findet man häufig die gewagte Behauptung, das 
interpersonale Verständnis sei in der Sui-generis-Form der intentionalen Erfahrung verwurzelt, 
die meistens als Empathie (Einfühlung) bezeichnet wird. Die vorliegende Arbeit erforscht diese 
Behauptung, indem sie ihren distinktiven Charakter hervorhebt und phänomenologische Betrach-
tungen examiniert, die zu ihrer Verteidigung deren zwei Hauptbefürworter, Edmund Husserl und 
Edith Stein, vorgebracht haben. Nachdem ich im zweiten Teil einige vorbereitende Hinweise ange-
bracht habe, darüber, wie man Empathie auslegen sollte, widme ich mich danach einigen Charak-
terisierungen ihrer distinktiven Struktur, indem ich im dritten Teil die husserlsche These betrachte, 
bestimmte Formen der Empathie seien in ihrer Natur perzeputell, und im vierten Teil Steins Beste-
hen darauf, dass die empathische Erfahrung oftmals Explikationen eigener intentionaler Erfah-
rungen anderer enthält. Teil fünf schließt mit der Beurteilung ab, in welchem Umfang ihre Analysen 




Husserl et Stein sur la phénoménologie de l’empathie : perception et explication
Résumé
Dans la tradition phénoménologique, on trouve souvent qu’il est audacieux d’affirmer que la 
compréhension interpersonnelle soit enracinée dans une forme sui	generis de l’expérience inten-
tionnelle, désignée généralement comme empathie (Einfühlung). L’article suivant explore cette 
affirmation, en soulignant son caractère distinctif et en examinant les considérations phénomé-
nologiques que proposent en sa défense deux de ses principaux partisans, Edmund Husserl et 
Edith Stein. Après avoir proposé dans la partie 2 quelques indications préliminaires sur comment 
l’empathie devrait être comprise, je me tourne ensuite vers quelques descriptions de la structure 
caractéristique de celle-ci, en considérant, dans la partie 3, l’affirmation husserlienne d’après 
laquelle certaines formes d’empathies sont de nature perceptive, puis dans la partie 4, l’insis-
tance d’Edith Stein sur le fait que l’expérience empathique implique souvent l’explication des 
expériences intentionnelles propres à l’autre. La partie 5 conclura en évaluant jusqu’où leurs 
analyses soutiennent une conception d’empathie comme expérience intuitive des autres esprits.
Mots-clés
empathie,	perception,	compréhension	interpersonnelle,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein
